Recent research on the effects of credit access among low-and moderate-income households finds that high cost payday loans exacerbate, rather than alleviate, financial distress for a subset of borrowers (Melzer (2011) and Skiba and Tobacman (2011) ). In this study I find that others, outside the borrowing household, bear a portion of these costs too: households with payday loan access are 20% more likely to use food assistance benefits and 10% less likely to make child support payments required of non-resident parents. These findings suggest that as borrowers accommodate interest and principal payments on payday loan debt, they prioritize loan payments over other liabilities like child support payments and they turn to transfer programs like food stamps to supplement the household's resources. To establish this finding, the analysis uses a measure of payday loan access that is robust to the concern that state policies governing payday lending and lender location decisions are endogenous relative to household financial condition. The analysis also confirms that the effect is absent in the mid-1990s, prior to the spread of payday lending, and that the effect grows over time, in parallel with the growth of payday lending.
I.
Introduction
The expansion of credit to low-and moderate-income households in the United States was a notable development of the 2000s, with substantial growth not only in mortgage credit but also in short-term, unsecured credit: overdraft loans provided by banks and cash advances provided by so-called payday lenders. Recent experience in the housing market suggests that there were substantial spillover costs from the mortgage credit boom, costs borne by taxpayers who have funded mortgage modification subsidies and bank bailouts, and by neighbors whose home values have declined with nearby foreclosures. The goal of this paper is to examine the importance of spillover costs for short-term credit by testing whether food stamp participation and child support payments vary with payday loan access.
There has been considerable debate about whether payday lending alleviates or exacerbates financial distress. In principle, access to credit can improve welfare by allowing households to smooth expenditures through periods of income and consumption shocks. But payday loans are also quite expensive, with a typical bi-weekly fee of $15 per $100 borrowed.
Given these high costs, borrowing to increase current consumption can exacerbate hardship in the future, especially among individuals with forecasting or self-control problems (Ausubel 1991; Laibson 1997; Bond, Musto and Yilmaz 2009 ).
Though results vary across studies, there is evidence that the expansion of payday credit exacerbates financial difficulties, at least for a subset of borrowers: rather than allowing households to pay important bills and forestall bankruptcy, payday loans exacerbate their difficulty in paying mortgage, rent and utilities bills (Melzer 2011) and increase their likelihood of filing bankruptcy (Skiba and Tobacman 2011) . Among military personnel, payday loan access worsens job performance and readiness (Carrell and Zinman 2008) . This evidence suggests that loan access is costly rather than beneficial for some households.
This study probes more deeply into who bears these costs. Clearly the borrower and others within the household bear some cost as they fall short on bill payments and move toward bankruptcy. In this analysis, I find that others outside of the household share the burden as well, as households with proximate access to payday loans are 20% more likely to use food stamps and 10% less likely to make child support payments. The increase in food stamp receipt helps explain why measures of food-related hardship -cutting back on quantity or quality of meals due to lack of money -show no significant increase with payday lending despite increased hardship along other dimensions. These findings suggest that as borrowers adjust their other expenditures to accommodate interest and principal payments on payday loan debt, they turn to transfer programs like food stamps to supplement the household's resources and they prioritize loan payments over other liabilities like child support payments.
The analysis follows Melzer (2011) in using geographic variation in payday loan access that does not depend on cross-state comparisons. The study design relies on the fact that loan access varies among households in states that prohibit payday lending: households residing close to a payday-allowing state can borrow at stores across the border, while households far from the border face more limited access. Isolating within-state variation is important because of the considerable variation in food stamp participation across states and the noteworthy trends in food stamp participation during the study period. Accordingly, an empirical design that uses crossstate comparisons or that traces changes around state payday loan prohibitions is ill suited; it is quite possible that other differences will confound the variation in payday lending.
For this research design to be effective, the border areas proximate to payday lending must be comparable to non-border areas, at least after controlling for observable differences. As measured by income and unemployment rates, the two areas are quite similar; if anything, households with payday loan access are slightly more prosperous. Demographically, areas with loan access are less populous, less urban and less racially diverse. To assure comparability, all regressions include controls for these differences. The analysis also includes additional tests to confirm that other county-level differences are not confounded with the difference in payday loan access. First, I confirm that the effect of payday lending on food stamp receipt is absent in mid-1990s, before payday loan stores had much of a presence. Second, I confirm that the effect of payday lending on food stamp receipt grows through time, as does payday loan availability. While the topic is quite different, the spirit of this inquiry parallels Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2011) , who find that displaced workers do not bear all of the costs of dislocation after traderelated employment shocks, as they use transfer benefits to replace lost income. As noted earlier, studies of payday lending are not uniform in their conclusion that loan access aggravates financial hardship. Morgan and Strain (2009) find that bounced check volumes are lower before the prohibition of payday lending in North Carolina and Georgia. Morse (2011) To qualify for SNAP, a household must pass income and asset tests. Those with monthly income below 130% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) qualify, as long as their assets (excluding primary residence and retirement savings) do not exceed $2,000. The 2011 poverty level for a family of four is $22,350 annually ($1863 monthly), which means that households with income below $29,055 annually ($2,422 monthly) qualify for food stamps as long as they lack $2,000 in assets.
SNAP benefit payments also vary with income: a maximum allotment is set based on family size, and the benefit payment declines from that amount as household income rises. played an important role in the decline of food stamp participation; since welfare offices often signed up eligible households for food stamps, the decline in cash welfare corresponded to a decline in food stamps (references to be added). Estimated participation rates also vary considerable across states, from a low of 53% in California to a high of 99% to 100% in Oregon and Maine.
II.C. Child Support
Child support orders, which mandate the financial support of children by nonresident parents, are put in place to ensure the well-being of children in single parent households.
Particularly for low-income families, child support payments are an important source of income: among families below the poverty level that receive child support, those payments constitute one third of income (Sorenson and Oliver, 2002 if the household was unable to pay its mortgage, rent or utilities bills or if anyone in the household failed to get needed dental or medical care over the prior twelve months.
The second phase of the analysis examines food stamp utilization, using both an indicator variable for receipt (FS received) and a continuous variable (FS Amount) for the dollar amount of benefits received. Though food stamp information is collected for every month, I follow the literature in dropping observations outside of the interview month. As a result the dependent variable is a measure of monthly food stamp usage at a frequency of every four months. The rationale for this adjustment to the sample is that there tend to be substantial jumps in survey reports at the "seam" between interviews, seemingly because households recall food stamp usage in the most recent month most clearly and repeat that response for prior months for which they don't recall their usage.
The third phase of the analysis examines child support payments. CS Payment Required?
and CS Paid? are indicator variables, the first measuring whether anyone in the household were required to pay child support and the second measuring whether any payments were made. Payday Access areas are also less populous and more rural: the average 2000 Census population in an access area is 150,000 with 50% urban population, compared to an average population of 250,000 in non-access areas, 60% of which is in an urban area.
Household-level summary statistics for the regression sample (below $4,166 in monthly income), shown in Panel B, confirm that even within the low-to moderate-income group, households with Payday Access appear to be more prosperous. They have higher monthly income ($2,100 vs. $2000) and higher rates of home ownership (58% vs. 46%), and they are slightly less likely to be unemployed (5.4% vs. 5.5%) or uninsured (19% vs. 21%). Educational attainment is modestly higher in Payday Access areas, largely due to a higher proportion of households with at least a high school diploma or some college experience. Disparities in racial/ethnic composition are more striking, with fewer minorities in Payday Access areas: the proportion of black households is 14%, compared to 19% in areas without access, and the proportion of Hispanic households is 3%, compared to 12% in areas without access. In other household characteristics like number of children, household size and householder age there is little difference between access and non-access areas.
To summarize, the sample statistics show economic and demographic differences between areas with and without payday loan access. These differences are important to keep in mind for the regression analysis of food stamp usage. While the regressions will include controls for all of these observable differences, one might have concerns that the controls are inadequate, and that omitted characteristics may diverge similarly between the two areas. McKernan and Ratcliffe (2003) show that food stamp usage tends to rise with unemployment, as one would expect. Notably, the observable differences in unemployment and income would predict lower food stamp usage in Payday Access areas.
IV. Regression Analysis
The regression analysis uses the following model:
β is the coefficient of interest. All specifications include state-year fixed effects, denoted by γ, so that β is not identified from cross-state differences in hardship or state-level changes in hardship over time. All models include a vector of household-level controls, denoted by X, and a vector of county-level controls, denoted by Z. All household-level variables are listed in the table of summary statistics (Table I) . The county-level controls include three static measures from the 2000 Census -county median income, population and percent urban population -as well as
Border, an indicator for whether the household is located within 25 miles of a state border. Z also includes two time-varying controls, the county's unemployment rate and per capita personal income. These county-level controls are crucial because Payday Access varies at the county level.
IV.A. Payday Access and Economic Hardship
This section replicates the analysis of Melzer (2011) The regression results, shown in Table II 
IV.B. Payday Access and Food Stamps
Results for the regression analysis of food stamps, shown in Table III, 
V. Discussion
Taking income and family size -the two most important inputs in determining food stamp eligibility -to be largely exogenous to payday borrowing, the effects of payday lending on food stamps must operate through take-up. Borrowers take on a large debt service burden, an increase in expenses that can crowd out other expenditures over time and lead households to sign up for food stamps.
County-level unobservables are a concern for the research design. For example, one might worry that social safety net services differ systematically in Payday Access areas. Notes: Number of observations rounded down to nearest thousand in each regression; sample is restricted to food stamp-eligible households; standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by county; coefficient estimates do not use regression weights.
VI. Conclusion TO BE ADDED

